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I will begin by reflecting on what is present. I do not intend to list everything that is present or to work out a thorough scientific system of categorization for what is present, but I only intend to draw attention to some of what is present and some of its characteristics. I am also still working on writing and organizing this page, and there is a lot left to do.

Many individuals are present: red, square, B#, flow, sadness, pain, hunger, relation, focus, similarity, difference, distinction, and much more. Some individuals are connected to other individuals, for example, relation is present between the red and the square. Similarity is present between the red of the square and the red of the circle. Difference is present between the square and the circle of these same individuals. Distinction is present in every individual.

Focus is a "pointing" or "directedness" at individuals, and so focus is present with each of these individuals being reflected upon.

Relation is present between each individual present with every other individual present. Similarity and difference are also both present between each individual present and every other individual present. Therefore, categories of individuals are present because relations, similarities, and differences are present between all individuals. So categories of individuals are present based on their present similarities, differences, and relations, for example, one category will be called "sight", another "touch", another "smell", and so on.


Relations are just as present as any other individual, and relations are present between other relations. All of these present relations create an intricate tapestry of relations revealing categories of relations.

Similarity is present and is a type of relation. Similarity

Difference is present and it is a type of relation.


Relations are present between all the present individuals. The individuals have greater or lesser degrees of similarity and difference as well as having other types of relations. The individual red has a certain relation of similarity to the individual green, and they both have a certain relation of difference to the individual of the square; therefore, experiencing relations of individuals close enough in their relations and distinct enough from certain others to be classified as individuals of “vision”, even more specifically of “color”, and in some cases of a particular color such as “red”. These “categories” are in the individuals and their relations. [In other words, relations are experienced just as fundamentally as is a color, and relations of similarity and difference are as well. Individuals are experienced to be more or less similar and different from each other, creating a system of categories and sub-categories of individuals all with relations and diffences to other categories. So two patches of red are experienced to be the same color. Universals are experienced in the experience of relations of similarity and difference between various phenomena, and this is just a fact. They end up creating a multi-dimensional (many many more than 3 dimensions) web, that I sometimes compare to the universe as my own helpful illustration. Each star has greater proximity or distance to every other star. Their spatial position creates local star clusters which are factually a greater relational distance from other star clusters, and there are galaxies, and galaxy clusters, etc. Just like we can spatially represent the distance between musical notes or colors, the same principle applies except that it must have much, much more than 3-dimensions of possible relations.]

Particular types of relationships between individuals reveal a specific type of unity of the individuals in relation to other individuals [for example, when the square is colored red, that is a special kind of relationship]. This unity of individuals is called a “visual patch”. The visual patch is exactly the particular individuals included and their particular relationships. One single change of an individual in it and that particular visual patch is no more. Visual patches have relations of similarity and difference between them.

Focusing may have a relation of directedness to any particular individual.

All visual patches have unique relations called "spatial relations" within themselves and to one another and to the special relation of individuals called the "visual field". The spatial relations within a visual patch have a spatial relation to the rest of the visual field called "orientation". [This is an impression of a two-dimensional realm of space, however, with some oddities due to its actual three-dimensional nature, to be demonstrated shortly].

Focusing may have a relation of directedness to a particular "area" of the visual field or of a visual patch. [We have the ability to focus on and point at an area in the visual field or of an area of a shape. For instance, I can focus on an empty position in space between me and the wall on the other side of the room. I can look at a circle and I can focus on area of its circumference.]

One special individual is called “flow”. The flow is a continuous shifting, a passing away with the arrival of a newness. The flow is always experienced and it is always experienced as linear and directional. [The “flow” is the experience of time itself passing]. Other phenomena and phenomenal patches have relationships to the flow. For example, the phenomenon of red might have a relationship to the flow [as when the color red is momentarily seen and then as if it is suddenly no longer seen. In other words, what I’m pointing out here is the experience of the shifting of our experience of time itself and its relationships with the experience of other phenomena.]

Other individuals and visual patches have relationships to other visual patches within the flow. For example, the individual of red has relationships to other red individuals within relation to the flow [as when the color red is momentarily seen and then it disappears and fades out of being seen, the color itself has disappeared but there are less intense red impression which are not identical to the original red but have very close relations to it in immediate positional relationships within the flow, as in a residual image; or when the color red is seen and then it is followed by a closely similar red, then a less similar red follows that one, etc. In other words, what I’m pointing out here is the experience of very closely related phenomena in very closely related positions within the flow].

Individuals that are not closely related in themselves also have relationships to the same position in the flow and so consequentially to each other. This type of relationship is called “simultaneity”. For example, an individual instance of the color red has a relationship to the individual of dislike by virtue of each of their specific relationships with the flow [as when the color red is seen and a feeling of disliking is experienced at the same time. However, it does not follow that these phenomena are related to each other in any other way beyond their general relationships as phenomena and their relationships to the same moments of time].

There is another individual called "representation" that has a relation to the individual of focusing simultaneously related in its being directed at a different kind of individual, and which simultaneously has strong relations of similarity between the former and the latter individuals . However, this unique string of relations from representation to focusing to other individuals can also be related through different positions in the flow. [This is the experience of a mental idea of an object that, for example, one sees or that one just saw. It is a mental representation focusing on an object, and can be illicited by and directed to an object that was just seen].

A visual patch might shift in the flow and relate to a different but extremely similar visual patch which also shifts to relate to a different but again extremely similar visual patch. All of these visual patches are distinct yet share very close relations of similarity and difference to each other. All of these might share the same spatial relationships with all the other visual patches in the visual field. Their relations of similarity and difference might set them apart from the rest of the visual patches revealing a category. The category of very similar visual patches in very close relations to the flow with very closely related spatial relations to other visual patches in the visual field will be called a "visual cluster". [If a visual patch is moving but staying in the same relative position to everything else, it will result in a series of different visual impressions, and technically these are all different visual patches. However, they share so many similarites and differences, that depending on the case, they may set themselves apart from all the other visual patches by their relations to the degree which gives them all a certain uniqueness to one another. It creates a category, but this category is not absolute. The category is an impression based on the relational similarities and differences between the visual patches within the category and those other visual patches in the visual field. Take again, for example, the analogy with the universe. Leaving out factors of rotation or formation, if we look at a snap shot of the universe we would see the spatial relationship of all the stars. We would also see that stars within each particular galaxy would have much closer spatial relations to one another than stars farther away. We would be able to SEE a greater concentration in an area, thereby giving us the impression of something unique about that region. We would draw an imaginary line around the galaxy demarcating its uniqueness from the stars within closer proximity to other galaxies. Likewise, in certain cases we SEE the closeness of the relations of particular phenomenal patches and see them as a distinct group from the other phenomenal patches. This distinction involves something subjective in its demarcation, but in certain cases it cannot be denied that those particular visual patches within the category do have more relations of similarity and less of difference than with the others and so reveal an objective distinction. I mean for us to picture an example where these distinctions are most extreme throughout the visual field, not a case of seeing a meadow covered with the same type of grass.]

Each visual patch in a visual cluster might have simultaneous spatial relations to other visual patches of different visual clusters which all have spatial relations to other visual patches in the visual field, and these various spatial relations of visual clusters may have relations of similarity and difference between their spatial relations to all visual patches in the visual field, revealing a unique set of relations among the visual clusters in the visual field called a "visual object". [Whereas in the last paragraph I was writing about visual clusters, here I am pointing out that when an object is moving, either through space or in place, that all the visual clusters are experienced to have special spatial relations to one another compared with all the other visual patches in one's visual field, which reveals a category of these relations distinct from everything else, that being what we call a visual object. I mean for us to picture an example where these distinctions are most extreme, not a case of seeing a meadow covered with the same type of flower.]

A visual object is a category of visual clusters and/or visual patches which have particular relations. Any set of specific spatial relationships between the visual clusters and visual patches that make up a visual object, and this set's spatial relations to all other visual patches in the visual field is called a "visual image". A visual image might shift in the flow and relate to a different but extremely similar visual image which also shifts to relate to a different but again extremely similar visual image, as was stated in the previous paragraph, revealing the category of the "visual object". [If an object is moving through the visual field or if it is moving in place, it is changing position, and so the visual object properly consists of a number of different visual images. These similarities and differences between these particular visual images can reveal a set of objective relations with all other visual patches, visual clusters, visual images, and visual objects, distinguishing that collection of visual clusters and visual patches as a category that can be focused on.]

Focusing might be directed at a visual object. A representation might have a relation to a focusing that has the relation of being directed at a visual object from its simultaneous relation to one of the visual images within the visual object with its particular relation to the flow. [We can mentally point at a visual object as one thing. We can also see a visual object and form a mental picture of it that refers to the former. This is possible, again, by the very close relations of similarity and few relations of difference that is experienced between all of the visual object's constituents.]

A visual image might shift in the flow and relate to a different but extremely similar visual image which also shifts to relate to a different but again extremely similar visual image, revealing a visual object. Each of these visual images might have a simultaneous relationship to the flow with other visual objects in the visual field, each of which might have simultaneous relations of similarity and difference between their spatial relations with the rest of the visual patches, visual clusters, and visual objects of the visual field in each's relation to the flow. As all of these spatial relations are interrelated there is a special phenomenon that includes the totality of these spatial relations called "space". [When one changes one's location, one sees that the objects in one's field of vision change their appearance because the perspective on them is different, they have a different visual image of that object. These different visual objects also have very similar spatial relations to the other objects in ones field of vision, which are also changing in their spatial relations to everything else. So each visual object in the field of vision all retain very similar spatial relations and similar changes in those spatial relations to one another through successive moments of time and as our mind can identify a visual object as a thing, it can naturally track the movement and spatial relations of those various objects and naturally understands the inter-relations of the spatial relations between the positions of the objects in space.]

There is a special individual called "spatial representation" which includes a number of representations of visual objects each with spatial relations to one another, which are closely related in similarity and difference to the spatial relations between a number of visual objects [the non-present phenomenon, you missed a step]. [Our mind naturally tracks and maps the change in positions of the objects one sees and places them in a 3 dimensional map in one's head, often this happens without conscious decision or awareness. This map is usually just understood subconsciously, but it can also be seen with the mind's eye. However, the mental map is a 3-d projection, which means it still gives position to things and tracks them even when they leave the field of vision. It yields an awareness of the spatial positions behind us and behind the objects that we see.]

[do idea's]

There is a special individual called "expectation" which has relations to an idea and to focusing which is directed at a particular visual object in space and a specific set of spatial relations in the spatial representation while that is focusing directed to space and the visual object. [Sometimes we may experience an expectation of a certain image of an object if we were to move through space to perceive that object from a particular perspective. Again, this is usually subconscious, but one can be conscious of it. I mean to refer to one specific case of this, in the expectation of certain spatial relationships of the object with other objects and within itself. The expectation is created from the spatial map in ones head of how all the positions of space are inter-related and how the lines and contours of objects are positioned in that space regardless of perspective. It would continuously baffle us if we would see an object as having Escherian spatial relationships from certain perspectives. This is the first if-then experience that we have dealt with, however, it is different from coming to associate something from past experience and expecting something based on inference, instead it is due to the logic of our mental spatial mapping. It makes no difference that space is actually non-Euclidean.]

A visual object can still have spatial relations in the spatial representation though the visual object is not in the visual field. [This means that when we move through space in which there are a number of objects we see their spatial relations to one another in 3-dimensional space which is possible because they are related to our spatial representation, which is a 3-dimensional map itself that cannot help but map with volume, keeping track of everything's spatial relations to everything else. So when an object passes the edge of the visual field, our mind naturally continues to maintain the object's position in that 3-dimensional space. This is simply a matter of understanding and experiencing spatial relations. This would then be an experience of natural belief, not based on any kind of associative move of the intellect but brought about by the logic of spatial relations, even if is it subconscious, that an object is still present even though it is not perceived.]

The visual field has a special spatial relation to the individuals in space and the spatial representation called an "origin point". [Moving around through space and viewing the objects therein reveals a spatial oddity, in that the visual field and spatial relations between objects are spatially related to a particular position in space, that being the origin point (the 0,0,0 position) from which we are spatially related to the objects. It is directly experienced just like everything else on this page. And so is a position in space that changes but which all the other objects continually point to, in a sense.]

Visual patches within a visual object have spatial relations to the origin point and also to the spatial representation called a "spatial position". [The spatial position is an object's spatial relation to us.]

The spatial relations within a visual patch and between the visual patches within a visual object have relations to the spatial representation with particular spatial position, and may have a relation to a representation that is focused at the visual patch or visual object within the spatial representation. The unique spatial position of a particular visual patch in relation to its visual cluster or a visual image in relation to its visual object (as well as how the former may relate to the latter) is a special present individual called "perspective". [As the shapes and spatial relationships of objects are mapped in the spatial representation, which also has an origin position which things are related to, the shape of an object is understood to look how it looks from a particular position in space related to it.]

The present individual of distinction is related between the individuals in the visual field and the individuals in the spatial representation. [Through the spatial relations in the visual field and the ability to mentally map those spatial relations, we experience from the nature of the relations that a square will look different from one perspective compared with another, and likewise, with the objects we see, we just understand that how a shape or object looks to us is a matter of what spatial position we have in relation to that shape or object. This shows us that the shape we see in the visual field is only an aspect of something else that is positioned in space, thus, we experience a distinction between phenomena and thing.]

There is a present individual called "belief" which includes the present individual of expectation and a relation between it and an idea (which has a relation of similarity to a visual object in the visual field), and that visual object in the visual field (that the idea has a relation of similarity with), as well as a relation with a particular spatial perspective on that visual object. [The experience of belief can arise when I see an object in space and naturally expect, based on the geometic relations, that the object will look a certain way from a particular perspective.]

[Expectation that the object will still be where it was]

[Expecting an object to look a certain way from a certain perspective]

[There is a smallest unit of sight]


Like the individuals related together into the category of sight, the following individuals have relations of similarity which reveal a unique category of these individuals called "tactile sensations". These phenomena also have relations to other phenomena like difference, distinction, focusing, flow, simultaneity, representation, and space.

There is a phenomena called "touch". [There are areas of the skin that I can feel even though there is no contact, and other areas of the skin that I cannot feel. However, although I know I have constantly felt my own skin, I am not continuously aware of it, and so it seems that I only feel it consciously when I focus on feeling something from my body or a part of my body (as I can try and focus on my entire body and let myself experience the feelings), this causes a problem of having to focus on the body, presupposing my awareness of it, in order to notice the feeling. And although I believe this is due to the brain still receiving the impressions but muting the impressions due to a prioritization of focus, the fact of their impression on the conscious mind without my focusing on them is questionable. This could be due to the constant feeling of gravity on my body, the surrounding air, or the feeling of blood flowing through me as well. When I do focus on feeling my skin in a particular area I cannot feel all of my skin. For example, my arms seem like lines of unknown thickness, with some gaps traveling down to my hand where the feeling spreads out into an unknown area. If I focus on the feelings in my fingers then I can feel them as one broad area, or I can feel that a particular finger is a line of feeling of unknown thickness moving from that area up to the pad of my finger which again spread out into an unknown area. I can't accurately tell the distance between these individual lines, but I can tell they are distinct. Although the spatial dimensions aren't perfectly represented in pure feeling (compared with my feeling the dimensions of my body out with other parts of my body, or with how it looks), spatial relations are still felt within limited crude dimensions. I can distinguish the spatial relations between the feeling in my pinky finger and pointer finger, as well as across my hand and between my pointer finger and a point in the line of my forearm. If a foreign object is placed on my skin over a certain broad area of contact I can distinguish many spatial sides of it and another, in other words I can distinguish different points within it, if the object is small enough (and it doesn't need to be very small at all) I can lose the ability to distinguish sides of the feeling, becoming a point of feeling that I cannot break up in feeling alone. If a smaller foreign object is touched to the skin I can sometimes be able to tell that the area felt is smaller compared with what else I feel or felt, and I can reach a point of smallness of size, obviously, where I can no longer feel anything at all until the force of the object into my skin is increased, but of course all of this is only verified in other ways. If an object is touched to my forearm and then dragged along my skin, I can not only feel the continuous line of contact and feel for some short time the spatial relations of various points in it, I can also crudely trace its path in the mental spatial faculty. If the object is dragged around my arm the mental map of the feeling reveals a vague circularity, adding complex dimensional depth to this sense organ. Shapes and symbols can be written onto the skin with pressure and the mind map it and identify its shape or symbol within certain limits of complexity. A voluntary movement includes feeling muscles contract and changes in the other conditions of my body part, as in its relation to the gravitational pull, blood flow, surrounding air and temperature, and what parts of my skin touch other parts of my skin. Point being more tactile sense organs are stimulated and a fuller feeling of ones body parts and their connections and spatial relations is experienced. There is also a close connection between one's will and the movement, but some development to distinguish them from Schopenhauer's identification of these things is necessary.]

There is a relation between the individual of feeling and the individual of spatial representation.

There is a category of individuals called "movement".

There is a category of individuals called "touch". The phenomenon of touch is related to feeling through that special object called "body". These phenomena have similarities and differences revealing categories of touch including such categories as: solidity, texture, temperature, mobility.

[feelings include: pressure, internal energy, electrical charge, and internal organs like heartbeat, lungs breathing, stomachaching, headaching, bladder pressure, etc.]

There is a category of individuals called "pain".

There is a category of individuals called "pleasure" [What is the proper word for the specific tactile pleasure?].

There is a category of individuals called "tickle".

There is a category of individuals called "tingle".

There is a category of individuals called "heat".

There is a category of individuals called "cold".

There is a category of individuals called "humidity".

There is a category of individuals called "movement". [One can feel ones muscle tensed, stretched. One can even feel blood flow. There are certain areas of the skin that I can always feel and other areas I cannot.]

[The spatial representation of the body in space, and of objects (though there is no experience of the continued existence of parts of the objects that were previously felt).]

[I need to come up with different names for these phenomena so that one doesn't draw associations between them and other phenomena based on name.]

[Can indicate an object, can also mentally map shapes and spatial relationships giving full spatial representation. As was mentioned above, one can always feel certain areas of the skin and so one's own body is experienced spatially. There is a smallest unit of touch.]


The following individuals have relations of similarity which reveal a unique category of these individuals called "Sound". Also like the individuals in the category of sight, the individuals within the category of sound have relations to other individuals within the categoris of difference, distinction, focusing, flow, simultaneity, representation, and space.

[The two-faced spatial sphere]

[Cannot be of an object, only sounds]


The following phenomena have relations of similarity which reveal a unique category of these phenomena called "smells". These phenomena also have relations to other phenomena like difference, distinction, focusing, flow, simultaneity, representation, and space.

[The spatial representation of both nostrils and within each nostril]

[Cannot be of an object, only smells]


The following phenomena have relations of similarity which reveal a unique category of these phenomena called "tastes". These phenomena also have relations to other phenomena like difference, distinction, focusing, flow, simultaneity, representation, and space.

[The spatial representation of taste over the surface of the tongue]

[Cannot be of an object, only tastes.]


The following phenomena have relations of similarity which reveal a unique category of these phenomena called "emotions". These phenomena also have relations to other phenomena like difference, distinction, focusing, flow, simultaneity.

[Cannot be of an object, only emotions]

Though one usually experiences emotions for a reason or in relation to a state in the world, emotions can be felt without reference to anything else.


The following phenomena have relations of similarity which reveal a unique category of these phenomena called "emotions". These phenomena also have relations to other phenomena like difference, distinction, focusing, flow, simultaneity.

Feelings include phenomena like desire, loneliness,


The following phenomena have relations of similarity which reveal a unique category of these phenomena called "emotions". These phenomena also have relations to other phenomena like difference, distinction, focusing, flow, simultaneity.


The following phenomena have relations of similarity which reveal a unique category of these phenomena called "abstracts". These phenomena also have relations to other phenomena like difference, distinction, focusing, flow, simultaneity, and space.


Feeling is in 3-d space. But its a very limited volume of 3-d space. The rest of 3-d space is an intellectual function, however, right now I cannot classify it as something subjective or "mental". It must be treated on the same level as the senses, however, it does subsist as some sort of secondary status in some sense since the senses supply the specific stuff for the subjective space.

make use of the sensory deprivation video

The spatial relationships that I just see only extend the width of the visual field and even become somewhat vague on the periphery of the visual field. I am not justified in positing spatial relations extending beyond the visual field, for they simply aren't presented like those in the visual field. A possible exception to this are the spatial relationships, colors, and shapes that have very recently just passed out of my visual field because of their relations to a past time that is close enough to be part of the present time or at least tied up together in experienced temporal relations.

It still remains a problem that 3-d space might only be one possible interpretation of the phenomena presented visually.

Geometry can prove that the visual changes are consistent with 3-d space but it is also consistent with 2-d space.

With touch, space is 3-d because the body is felt in 3-d. it is important to note that I can feel many parts of my body simultaneously, I am aware of its sensations, even if I can only consciously focus on one part of my body at a time. As my limbs move through space or as I feel a physical object, I no longer hav the sensations in the positions of space I did moments before. This is a problem for rationally believing in those previous positions of space, but there is a separate category of information that insinuates itself here, something insinuates that there is a sensation (as in touching part of an object) or is not a sensation (nothing at that position) at particular positions in space. This might be based on the past where I "touched something" or "moved freely" before, but the point is it is automatically insinuated into the space realm of my touch in the present. It is presented so is it justified or unjustified? First of all, this insinuation does not come from the category of touch, it is its own category, so do I have justification for dismissing what is presented? Well, it is derived from touch, it doesn't present itself independently but only dependently on touch, even if it is a separate category.

Even though the phenomena of sight is seen all together, I can still pick out shapes and colors, and those things stand out on their own, and these individual phenomena are distinct parts of the whole merely sharing some nonessential relations with the other parts of the whole, however, these relations are to be kept in mind, and I should consider the implications of the wholistic perspective. There is a very limited experience of space itself in each of the senses. Sight 2-D; Hearing 3-D directionality; Touch limited 3-D; smell and taste 2-D. It is hard to say whether the area presented in smell and taste would have the perceived dimensions it apparently has, without the 3-d mental placement it has. I do not choose to place these experiences in space, they are coordinated there for me. And through this mental faculty their various relationships are experienced and arise. Note that if space turns out to be subjective then it is this subjective faculty that is necessary for these relations to exist for us, and we have no justification supporting their objectivity. For example, a bark, the touch, and the visual counter part of a dog only have their relation in the same location of space by the subjective faculty, and is merely reinforced by other associations like the way something sounds bcoming associated with a place in space and verification through conjunction of there being the object expected in that location, and feeling a touch when we see our hand touch an object. If these things changed we would be shocked and bewildered at first but would become used to it.

(I jumped ahead here, what is an object?) Remember that taste, smell, hearing, are all simple phenomena that by themselves could never result in the concept of an object, not even with the spatial faculty, specifically because there is nothing in them that can locate the self in space in relation to other things, but also, moreso, because

In every type of sense there are phenomena which can acquire an identity; the buzzing around, the taste of a slush moving over my tongue, etc. that even if they logically aren't the same they are able to be grouped into phenomena extremely similar, enough to classify together, but with taste, smell, and hearing there is no background or field experienced on which the phenomena is placed, instead the phenomena is all that is presented. However, with sight there are other phenomena to act as a background for particular phenomena to be spatially related to. And with touch there is the rest of the body as background to the more intense feeling of touch.

As was dealt with above, there are phenomena, and these phenomena are related in various ways to all other phenomena. The presence of these phenomena and their relations cannot be denied without contradiction. The various phenomena and their relations create an inter-related system of myriad categories, including such categories of phenomena as sight, touch, hearing, taste, smell, ideas, emotions, etc. The internal relations of phenomena in various specific categories was described, nowhere near exhaustively, and some truths were noted.

First, there are a few special phenomena that should be mentioned. There is the phenomenon of "focusing", which is a mental pointing at other phenomena. There are phenomena of similarity and phenomena of difference. There is the phenomenon of time. There is the phenomena of "representation" forming a sub-category within the category of ideas, where specific ideas are constructed to share relations of similarity with other specific phenomena.

Now we will deal with the phenomena in the category of sight. These phenomena are based on spatial relationships of colors in a visual field. The phenomenon of focusing can pick out specific colors and spatial reltionships and see them as distinct from others. Certain spatial relationships of colors in this visual field make up another phenomena, to wit, that of shape. The relation between colors and shapes is another phenomena, to wit, that of phenomenal object. Though phenomenal objects are presented as single entities, the focusing of the mind can point at a phenomenal object's spatial parts in relation to its other parts. The phenomenal objects have spatial relationships to one another within the visual field, however, an additional feature is discovered to be added to the visual field but which does not originate in it, to wit, the phenomena of 3-dimensional space. The visual field is a simple 2-dimensions, ultimately made up of smallest units as there is a point where a "pixel" of color cannot be any smaller without disappearing and focusing cannot point at any one part of it as opposed to any other part. Though the visual field is only 2-dimensional (with some peculiarities in it from the fact that we have two eyes and so foreground objects make funny juxtaposition in relation to background objects, but this cannot be understood as due to the objects' being 3-dimensional until the visual field is understood to be representing 3-dimensional space, and this doesn't come from the data itself), there is a phenomenon of spatial representation of 3-dimensional space which understands the geometry of 3-dimensional space and projects that understanding into the visual field (or more accurately, the visual field is positioned appropriately within the 3-d mental map). Its conclusions were proven by Euclid, and so are logically valid. In other words, when I see a cube from a particular angle, a mental mapping and intuitive understanding of Euclidean space sees the lines of the sides of the cube as plotted in 3-dimensional space, and overlaps the 2-d visual field with 3-d understanding.

The 3-d understanding and mapping of objects in the visual field logically implies the existence of other perspectives to the phenomenal objects we see, perspectives that are not present. This ability to understand what a square would look like if seen from different perspectives allows us to understand that the visual field is only a perspective of 3-d space, and that various phenomenal objects are, in fact, the same object (from now on called a "physical object") from different spatial perspectives. This understanding often results in the phenomena of expectation of seeing a particular phenomenal object from a non-present perspective on the physical object.

The 3-d understanding also maps the physical objects after they have left the visual field, and so the continued placement of physical objects in space is understood by the spatial relationships they still hold in relation to the visual field. This and the aformenetioned fact of non-present aspects of physical objects show that there is a distinction in some phenomena of sight between the phenomena and the physical objects they are merely aspects of.

Touch is very similar to sight. There is phenomenon of feeling that is spatially related to other phenomena of feeling. Parts of the skin are felt and they are felt in relation to other parts of the skin and the same type of spatial mapping and understanding occurs. The phenomena of touch are experienced spatially and understood and positioned in terms of the 3-d mental map. The phenomenon of focusing can also point to some phenomena of touch and distinguish between one spatial part of it and another, but sometimes it cannot distinguish between parts and so it feels singular. The spatial positioning of some of these phenomena of touch are imprecise in their exact positioning but can be generally located. Through spatial understanding of the approximate position of the body, the contact with physical objects creates a unique phenomenon of touch, and by mapping the movement of the body while feeling out the lines of physical objects, the same spatial understanding of physical objects is logically understood. So if there were only the sense of touch, one would still perceive physical objects and their spatial relationships and extentions, and be able to position such physical objects in 3-d space, as well as expect certain phenomena of touch on particular perspectives of physical objects and understand non-present aspects of those physical objects.

Both sight and touch lay their fields within the 3-d mental map, and so understanding of the spatial relations in each of their fields is unified to some extent, though not perfectly. This is enhanced through continuous experience of supportive conjunctions of phenomena in each.

From what has been shown above, the subjective-objective distinction arises through the senses of sight and/or touch in certain experiences. The concept of "physical object" is discovered as that object that has continued presence in space as it is, without ideal representation, and apart from visual and tactile perspectives of it. The other senses only deal specifically with phenomena and do not reveal a subjective-objective distinction. However, subject-object distinction also arises from imagination of an object in space through imagined sight and/or touch. Now, the imagined object is not a physical object, but it is a mental object.

None of the other phenomena give rise to the concepts of the subjective or objective realms nor physical objects, and therefore, they cannot be legitimately related to either the subjective or the objective realm. However, there is still the mental representation of phenomena that does intentionally refer to other phenomena, and their similarities to one another; and there is expectation. Representation of sense phenonema from the categories of emotions, taste, smell, or hearing, seems to require will (to create the representation), purpose (the intention of the representation to be like the phenomenon), understanding (that representation is attempting to be like a phenomenon).

The objective space of our reference and understanding is actually a subjective space that one uses the actual data from the tactile sense of the body or data from the visual field as a reference point and then projects its understanding of 3-dimensional space back onto. Our understanding of physical space is not simply an abstract creation but rather it is a combination of abstract understanding and interpretation of sense data from sight or touch. For example, when I see a cube, and I only see one side of it, my mind understands the spatial relationships and 3-dimensional lines that make up all sides of the cube, even those I don't see, but this understanding of its other aspects does not occur in the spatial representation, instead it is understood in its projection onto the visual field, using that very space and very object I presently see. This is obviously different from the spatial properties of the cube as pictured before one's mind's eye.

The other sensory phenomena are understood spatially in a secondary manner, even though each of the senses has a spatial extention to it, their spatial relations are understood through the spatiality of sight and/or touch. When one hears a sound, the faculty of which, in itself, has a spatial extention similar to a sphere with two foci, the sound is positioned in relation to the space of sight and touch, likewise for scent and taste.

This aspect of a physical object is expected to appear from a particular perspective. This representation has a high degree of similarity to a particular non-present object, be it a phenomenon or a physical object. This particular phenomenon has a specific relationship in the categories, i.e. this sound is shrill, this taste is sour; even "A sound is present" since the sound is actually a more specific phenomenon, like a shrill sound, this thought is not identical to what is happening. This particular phenomenon is closely related to a previous phenomenon.

One can focus on phenomena and physical objects that aren't experienced anymore. This allows other natural predicates to be attributed to those objects, present or not-present. If a particular sound is present and then not-present and then returns again, it may be recognized as the same sound but it will not be the same phenomenon. If it is not recongnized as the same sound its relations to other sounds should place it in the exact same position, and therefore correctly identify it. This obviously doesn't happen, so the relations are obviously subjective approximations.

Sight is made up of color through a visual field. Touch is made up of solidity through a felt body. Both color and solidity are the two subjective representations of the extension of physical objects, and neither is essential.

Four things have acquired objectification: physical objects, mental objects, space, and time.

Let me be clear, what has been written up to this point is not asserting that this is how we come to certain conclusions or how we see things, nor is it asserting universality. In fact, I personally believe that much of how we approach and think about the world and objects is innate, and that other ways are taught through one's cultural-historical context. What was presented here merely demonstrates that a specific set of concepts are supported logically from specific pure data, thus if such data is experienced those concepts have rational support. In other words, these concepts are not arbitrary. Though they may not be universal, that does not undermine its rational support just because other people have not been presented with the appropriate evidence.

The problem is that 3-dimensionality is not justified for vision, the visual field is nonrationally projected into the 3-d mental map. What is presented is a 2-dimensional visual field consisting of visual patches. These visual patches remain as distinct individuals as long as they don't change in any way, but once they do change they can no longer be thought to be identical with the previous visual patch. However, these differing visual patches do have present relations with each other, as long as the previous visual patch is still present within the very short duration of the present flow of the past. If they are then they are linked in their similarity. This very close connection in simlarity yields a category of similar individual visual patches that also share similar present relations with other categories of similar individual visual patches, allowing the visual field to present areas of some continuance despite its changing nature. These areas of continuance can act as "objects" consisting of many visual patches.

3-dimensionality is found in touch. The vague tactile phenomena of areas of the body are found presented in a 3-dimensional space, however, this 3-d space is somewhat crude in its conception. When trying to map other objects there is not justification for the parts of the object continuing to be solid when they are not present with tactile phenomena. Tactile objects and some of their 3-dimensionality are discovered through multiple areas of tactile phenomena presenting solidity in a 3-dimensional way. There is nothing rationally to support the body as a whole moving through 3-d space.

Physical objects, whatever they may be metaphysically, can only rationally be for us originated and based in their spatial location in relation to the tactile phenomena of my body, and a unique 3-d shape. But physical objects have to have something that distinguishes them from the phenomena itself as having hidden aspects. The phenomena in recent past flow is present in one sense but is not present in the immediate sense and so the tactile object is mapped as having other parts to it not immediately presented.

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