Heidegger - Being and Time

Pg. 40 "If being is to be concevied in terms of time then being is made visible in its 'temporal' character" - Why is Being to be conceived in terms of time? He kind of gives a quasi answer on 39. In the third paragraph he says that Being cannot be grasped except by taking time into consideration. Again, where is this supported?

From pg 38 2nd full paragraph I skipped over all the way up to pg 49 because I did not fully understand his use of "temporal" but also "historicality". Most of those pages consisted of H's assertion that we must wipe away the history of ontology to start fresh so that the past doesn't taint our analysis.

On pg 49 he starts talking about the phenomenological method. He says it is a methodological conception which does not have a special direction or stand point, and it characterizes the how of the philosophical research of objects instead of the what.

On pg 51 and 52 he defines "phenomenon" as that which shows itself, and defines "semblance" as that which shows itself as something it is not, and appearance as announcing itself though not showing itself through something else that does show itself.

Pg 65 The fundamental structure of Dasein is Being-in-the World which is something a priori, not pieced together, and is primodially and constantly a whole, but there are various ways of looking at the items (as phenomena) which are constitutive for it. These will be things like world in its worldhood; Being-in-the-World as Being-With and Being-One's-self; and Being-in as such. And we shall show that Dasein's existential meaning is care.

I P-9 Dasein comports itself towards its own Being, and its Being is an issue for it. "Existence" as a designation of Being will only be used of Dasein. "Existentia" is a type of Being we will use presence-at-hand for. Having properties present-at-hand (an entity "looks" so and so) and being present-at-hand are possible ways to be for Dasein but no more than that. "Dasein" expresses that being's Being not its "what"; its essence is in its "to be" in its "existence".

Pg. 68 has some very cryptic, abstruse stuff. Dasein essentially has its possibility in each case, so it can, in its very Being, 'choose' itself and win itself, it can also lose itself and never win itself, or only 'seem' to do so.

Being 'authentic' is being something of its own. 'Inauthenticity' does not signify any 'lower' degree of Being. Two characteristics of Dasein sketched so far are the priority of 'existentia' over essentia, and the fact that Dasein is in each case mine; which both show that the analytic of Dasein is a peculiar phenomenal domain.

Dasein never has the kind of being of something present-at-hand, so we must never present it as something we come across in the same way. The right way of presenting it is not self-evident, and so determining what form it shall take is an essential part of the ontological analytic of Dasein, so it must be presented in the right way in order to understand its Being. The formal meaning of Dasein's existential constitution is that Dasein always determines itself as an entity in light of a possibility which it is itself and it somehow understands.

We should not interpret Dasein according to a differentiated character of some definite way of existing, but it should be uncovered in its undifferentiated character as it is proximally and for the most part in its everydayness called this average everydayness "averageness", is what makes it up ontically proximal. In averageness Dasein's structure of existentiality lies a priori, and is an issue for Dasein in a definitive way and comports itself toward it in its mode of averageness. All explicata are obtained by considering Dasein's existence structure. Dasein's characters of Being are defined in terms of existentiality, so we call them "existentialia". "Categories" is for characteristics of Being not like Dasein. Existentialia and Categories are the two modes of the characters of Being.

P-10. H. argues for the primacy of analysis of Dasein's ontology in phenomenogy over other studies of Dasein like psychology, anthropology, and biology.

P-11 First analysis of Dasein can only occur by analyzing the structure of Dasein's everydayness, for studies of ancient man views them in the context of ethnology, and studies of the similarities of man in every culture will not give us what we seek because the syncretist activity of universal comparison and classification, for such ordering its content is a thing which is presupposed in the ordering. So if one is to put various pictures of the world in order one must have an explicit idea of the world, and if the world is constitutive for Dasein, one must have insight in Dasein's basic stuctures in order to treat the world-phenomenon conceptually.

II P-12. All entities whose Being "in" one another in a spatial sense have their Being as present-at-hand, as things occuring within the world (ultimately "in" world-space). Being-present-at-hand and Being-present-at-hand-along-with in the sense of a definite location relationship wiht something else of the same kind of Being are ontological characteristics called "categorial": they are of such a sort as to belong to entities whose kind of Being is not of the character of Dasein. On the other hand, Being-in is a state of Dasein's Being, an existentiala, meaning "to reside alongside", "to be familiar with", and Being-in-the-world is Dasein's essential state, in the sense of being absorbed in the world is an existentiale founded upon Being-in. In these analyses the issue is one of seeing a primordial structure of Dasein's Being, - a structure in accordance with whose phenomenal content the concepts of Being must be articulated. To examine this structure it shall be constrasted with categorial Being.

From 78-90 H. attacks the subject-object way of thinking, and attacks the traditional notion of knowing and reinterprets it. Important stuff.

Pg. 149 What is meant by "This interpretation has been put first"?

Pg. 160 Worldhood has been interpreted as the referential totality which constitutes significance. In understanding this significance Dasein lets what is ready-to-hand be encountered as discovered in its involvement. Being-fascinated is a subcategory of Being-in. The context of references or assignments which significance implies is the up with Dasein's ownmost being.

Back To Top



Back to Philosophical Works

Home Page

© 2009