Arthur Schopenhauer

The World as Will and Representation

The whole of reality is matter. Matter is only causality. The sole function of the understanding is to know causality. Manifestations of the understanding: 1) perception of actual world; the subject is immediately aware of his body which is affected (i.e. felt), then the subject uses the intellect to infer the cause, which results in the perception of the latter as object, hence, all perception is intellectual, but is necessary and immediate, not abstract. This is the cognitive method of the pure understanding, it turns meaningless sensation into perception. The understanding unites the forms of time and space in the representation of matter, i.e. effectiveness. The a priori nature of causality is proved by the dependence of all experience on it; knowledge of causality is a presupposed condition of perception. Cause and Effect only exist between objects, not between object and subject. Object and subject precede all knowledge as the first condition of perception and experience. Object always presupposes the subject and thus always remains the representation of the subject, and so there can't be a relation of reason and consequent. Form is the whole nature universal mode and manner of appearance. The Principle of Sufficient Reason is only the essential form of every object. The subject always remains outside of the province of the validity of the principle of sufficient reason. Not realizing this is the source of the controversey about the reality of the external world. Object and representation are the same thing, and the true being of the objects of perception is their action, so the existence of object outside the representation of subject is a contradiction. The world is nothing but causality, it is representation according to the law of causality in the understanding; this is called trancendental ideality. False disputes always occur due to an incorrect application of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Another origin of the question about the external world is due to our comparison between dreams and life, however, we always compare our recollection of dreams with life, and they are pages from the same book, and the only way to distinguish them is if there is a break in causal connection, if this is not perceivable we use Kant's criteria but this doesn't affect the reality of dreams, and if Kant's criteria cannot be ascertained, which is often the case, then it must remain undecided.

Knowableness deals only with objects, which are our representation. The immediate consciousness of the changes of the body is sensation from which the understanding works with. The body is an immediate object, the starting point for perception and thus of the subject's knowledge. The two conditions of perception are: the ability of bodies to act on one another (i.e. the law of causality in the understanding); and sensibility. Sensation preceeds the application of the understanding, so in this sense "body" isn't used in full sense, and in full sense only after the understanding gives it form, so the immediate object (the body) is never known. He defines animals and plants. Motives are conditioned by knowledge of causality. The understanding is the same in all animals and men, varying only in acuity and extent of its sphere. The abstract concepts of reaosn only deal with what is immediately understood (i.e. known) in a reflected consciousness of the abstract, and serve to make things clear, to explain to others. All the discoveries of natural science are due to an immediate insight by the understanding apprehending causal relations. In practical life it is called good sense or prudence. He offers other definitions and then criticizes systems that start from either the subjective or the objective. He argues against materialism and the limits of science. Pg 31 his argument for why time doesn't have a beginning. His argument against materialism is that it starts from object to arrive at subject and it overlooks the fact with any object you also have subject already. He says all deduction a priori rests on necessity which is based simply and solely of Principle of Sufficient Reason, since necessity and to follow from a given ground are same thing. The Principle of Sufficient Reason is nothing but universal form of the object, and is not valid outside it; it produces object and directs its appearance. Representation is first fact of consciousness. Time is nothing but succession, space nothing but position, matter is nothing but causality, the concept is nothing but reference to ground of knowledge. The representation's most general essential and fundamental form is subject and object. Man alone has reason (the subjective) which deals with concepts (objective), it is reflective and abstract, and its whole content is from what is perceived.

Doubt and error appear on the scene with the intro of reason. We always ought to pursue truth for the use may only appear later or the harm in ignorance may be indirect. Indeed if knowledge is what gives man power in life then all errors are harmful. Representations in relation to the subject are the sensibility and understanding (i.e. knowledge of causality), and in relation to the object are those which are referred to time, space, and matter; there is a third, reflection, which is a reflected appearance of his knowledge of perception. He goes on to define differences between man and animal due to reason; man has more power and suffering, man lives also in past and future, can plan for future, man has choice between many simultaneous motives. Speech is first product and necessary instrument of reason. The understanding has only one function, the immediate knowledge of the relation of cause and effect. Reason deals with concepts, which are representations which are abstract and universal copied from world of perception, they are representations of representations. The principle of sufficient reason that deals with concepts is ground of knowledge which may be supported by another concept or abstract representation but ultimately it must be grounded in knowledge of perception.

To know means to have the power of mind to reproduce true judgements. True judgments are judgements that have their sufficient ground of knowledge in something outside them. Thus only abstract knowledge is rational knowledge which is conditioned from faculty of reason and is different from knowledge of perception. That which is present in consciousness and not a concept is called a "feeling". All concepts and concepts only are denoted by words, they exist only for the faculty of reason and proceed therefrom. Because reason only deals with knowledge of perception, it does not extend our knowledge, only gives it another form, so it lets us know in the abstract and in general what we knew intuitively and in the concrete. Intuitive knowledge is only valid in a particular case for it can only comprehend one object at a time, so all practical use is derived from abstact knowledge. Number, which is the medium of the purely temporal quantity, is alone directly connected to abstract knowledge. To have abstract concepts of space it must be seen through number (read pg 54). Many things must be done with intuition and not with reason, like playing an instrument etc. Art and ethics both use reason in a subordinate manner only to the extent that it preserves ideas once formed and helps consistency, but their principle source is in the intuition. Schopenhauer's description of science. He also argues for intuitive knowledge over proof in regards to certainty for proof is always based on intuition first and concepts are vague.

Second Book: The principle of Sufficient Reason is the regular and orderly combination of one representation with another. The second book seeks to determine the significances, meaning, and understanding of the representation of perception. Philosophy shows us (more specifically Idealism and Skeptics) that the objects are the representation and deals with forms. Math only deals with quantity so can't help with our question. Natural science divides into morphology (description of forms and shapes) and Etiology (explanation of changes). Explanation shows how one state of matter is necessarily followed by another according to an invariable rule, So neither morphology nor etiology gives us what we are looking for because the former deals with infinitely varied forms which remain eternally strange to us and the latter does nothing more than show the orderly arrangement of states in space and time. The law of causality merely gives the rule and relative order of appearance only for representations, objects of a definite class, and only exists in relation to the subject. We want to know about the significance and if there is anything more to representations, and we know at least that whatever it is it is completely different from the representation so the forms and laws of the representation must be wholly foreign to it.

The subject is the conditional supporter of the whole world as representation but it is given entirely through the medium of a body and it is the starting point for the understanding of the perception of the world. To the subject of knowing, who appears as individual only through his identity with the body, the body is given in two ways: as object among objects and as what is immediately known, called will. Every true act of will is at once and inevitably a movement of body and every impression on body is immediately impression on will. The act of the will and the action of the body are in reality one and the same but given in two entirely different ways; directly, and in perception for the understanding. It is called pain when an impression is contrary to will and pleasure when in accordance with the will, they are immediate affections of the will in the impression in the body. The body as object among objects, as perception in the understanding, is mere representation and is one of the few impressions on the body that does not rouse the will and through these alone is the body an immediate object of knowledge. Stronger or heterogeneous affections of sense organs is painful or pleasurable (more often painful) whereas softer sensations won't affect the will but still results in perception. Knowledge of will is immediate but cannot be separated from that of the body. One knows his/her will not as a whole but as individual acts and hence in time. The only way to demonstartate the identity of the body and the will is direact and immediate consciousness and knowledge and he calls it philosophical truth unique from logical, empirical, trancendental, and metalogical. That the body occurs in consciousness in this way allows us to distinguish it from other objects in perception and gives us information about that body and about its action following motives; about what it is in itself and we don't have such immediate knowledge about any other objects. It is this relation that makes the knowing subject an individual.

Second Book The abstract representation (i.e. concept) only has its meaning through the representation of perception (its content). We will try and discover the significance of the latter, why it engrosses our whole nature. Philosophies that claim there is an object behind the representation tell us that it is different in its whole being but similar in certain ways, but this doesn't help us distinguish object from representation. Further, every object presupposes a subject and therefore is always representation. The principle of sufficient reason is the form of representation which is the regular and orderly combination of one representation with another and not with something that cannot be represented. Mathematics only tells us about these representations in so far as they are quantities.

These representations in regards to natural science: two main divisions of natural science are morphology (which deals with natural kinds and bringing individuals and forms under concepts; a description of forms and shapes) and etiology (which is an explanation of changes, the changing of matter according to the laws of transition from one form into another, knowledge of cause and effect, how one state of matter is necessarily followed by another definite state according to an invariable ruel and such a demonstration is called explanation). Morphology, however, can only deal with representations that remain eternally strange to us, like hieroglyphics. Etiology only points out orderly arrangement in time and space but we do not obtain slightest info about the inner nature of these phenomena. The law of causality only has validity for representations, and has meaning only when they are assumed, and like the objects, it only exists in relation to the subject. Thus it is known a priori and a posteriori as Kant taught us. This representation coonected to that representation according to this or that law generally speaking is the principle of sufficient reason. We want to know the significance of representations, if it is mere representation then it is like an empty dream not worth our consideration, or is there something beyond the representation? If there is something beyond it this must be completely and fundamentally different from the representation [why?] and so the forms and laws of representation must be foreign to it. However much we investigate we obtain nothing but images and names, this is the path all philosophers before me have followed.

18. We could never find whatever is beyond representation if we were merely pure knowing subject; but instead we are rooted in that world as an individual, and our knowledge (which is the conditional supporter of the whole world as representation) is given through the medium of a body [how does he know this? He says this was shown in another book and the answer to the riddle is will]. We have a special connection to the body through will, otherwise the body would be just like all other phenomena. Will reveals the significance and shows him the inner mechanism of his being, actions, and movements. The subject of knowing becomes individual only through idnetification with the body, but is known as phenomena and also immediately as will. Every true act of will is also at once and inevitably a movement of body. This is not cause and effect but are the same thing, though given in two different ways. The action of the body is nothing but will translated into perception or objectified (representation). Therefore it can be said that the will is knowledge a priori of the body, and that the body is knowledge a posteriori of the will.

Only in reflection are willing and acting different. Correspondingly, every impression on the body is also directly an impression on the will. Pain is when it is contrary to the will, pleasure when in accordance. Pain and pleasure are not representations but are immediate affections of the will in an impression on the body. [101 he describes breifly, how impressions relate to the will], Further evidence of this identity is that extreme movement of the will (i.e. every emotion) agitates the body and its functions. I don't know my will as a whole but only in its individual acts in the body, accordingly I cannot know of my will without my body. This identitty cannot be demonstrated because it is the most direct knowledge, which will be called philosophical knowledge and is another category beyond logical, empirical, transcendental, and metalogical.

Schopenhauer asserts on pg 102 there is only one way to demonstrate the identity of the body and the will: directly from immediate consciousness and it is the most direct knowledge and is of quite peculiar nature from the four sufficient reason: logical, empirical, transcendental, metalogical. These deal with the reference of an abstract representation to another representation, where as this other knowledge is the reference of a judgment to the relation between two completely different things, i.e. body as object and will. However on page 100 he says that the body is given in two ways: directly and immediately as will, and through perception for the understanding. Every true act of will is also at once and inevitably a movement of his boyd. Only the carrying out stamps the resolve of the will, tell then it is merely an intention that can be altered and exists only in reason in the abstract. Only in reflection are willing and acting different, in reality they are one. And on pg 101 cites as further evidence that vehement motions of the will (i.e. emotions agitates the vital functions of the body directly and immediately.) Objections: 1) willing in dreams is the same as willing in waking 2) willing when one is partially awake does not necessarily result in action 3) willing when one is paralyzed 4) willing when one has lost a limb 5) some people do not have good control over their limbs for example in dancing 6) Science has proven reaction time between willing and movement. 7) we are not directly aware of this connection and he asserts we are but then cites evidence supporting an inductive conclusion he also says that we are only directly aware of will 8) we can imagine ourselves without our body so they arenít necessarily the same.

19. So we have shown the body occurs in consciousness in a toto genere different way. We do not have such immediate information about the nature, action, and suffering of any other real objects. One sees the body as representation through abstraction. [Here is where Schopenhauer turns to art philosophy]. He dismisses solipsism as simply crazy, then draws an analogy between our body as will and other objects as representation to conclude that they must also be will. [He thinks representations don't have any existence in themselves, but will does] so he asks a rhetorical question "What other kind of existence could we attribute to the material world?" he asserts besides the will and representation nothing is known or conceivable for us, and we are acquainted with the greatest known reality in ourselves and so if we wish to attribute the greatest known reality to the world it will be will. [Doesn't the will become object as well? especially since it is identical to representation? And so the subject must be different from representation and will? For Schopenhauer to differentiate what is to be found in the various grades of representation from the inmost nature of the will, doesn't this suggest they are not identical?] Motives are conditioned by knowledge but both of these exist in the phenomenon.

20. Acts of will are one and the same with movements of the body and are distinguished from them only by the form of perceptibility as representation. Motives are the occasion of will showing itself the manifestation at a particular time, of the wills and these are subject to the law of motivation but the will itself lies outside this law. Therefore, no answer is possible when asking why the will itself wills one thing and not another.

The principle of sufficient reason in all its aspects is merely the form of knowledge. My will in general and as a whole is my character. If every action is an appearance of the will, then the will's appearance cannot be accidental and must depend on something existing directly through it, therefore the body is a phenomenon of the will, related to the will as a whole, i.e. intelligible character. He asserts that physiological accounts don't undermine the assertion that it still ultimately comes from the will, in fact, it is presupposed when talking of forces or laws of nature. The whole series of actions, every individual act and its conditions, namely the whole body and therefore the process through and in which the body exists, is objectivity of the will. The parts of the body were willed in accordance with the chief desires and demands by which the will manifests itself, ex. teeth, gullet, intestinal tract are objectified hunger. Likewise the character of the individual corresponds to individual body structure. [What about mutations, and birth defects, and desires without bodily correspondence, and body parts without use or corresponding desires, etc.]

21 He believes that continued reflection will lead one to recognize all phenomena and forces as that which is immediatly known to him better than everything else, and where it appears most distinctly is called will. It is this application of reflection that leads us past the phenomena to the thing in itself.

The thing-in-itself is never object, since all object is its mere appearance or phenomena, but in order to think about it objectively we must use the most distinct and directly enlightened by knowledge of its phenomena, which is will [Does it necessarily follow that the thing in itself must borrow its name and concept from an object we experience? And need it be the most distinct object? Is the will the most distinct object? Where is his evidence of this?] No word could exist to describe the concept of this thing-in-iself (genus) so he names it after the specie of which we have direct knowledge which lies nearest to us and leads to indirect knowledge of all others. The Will is broader than our specie of it we are acquainted with, so we can't attribute knowledge, reason, or motives to it. He thinks the thing-in-itself being Will is not inferred or a matter of convenient and arbitrary naming but it is known directly and known better than anything else [patently false with other people].

Our will is the only phenomenon that doesn't have its origin in the phenomena but comes from within, proceeding from the most immediate consciousness of everyone. He says in this consciousness each person knows his own individuality according to its nature immediatly and at the same time is this individual there is not even form of subject-object knower and known coincide. He suggests it is more clear to classify force under will than will under force because of our immediate knowledge of will and the abstract origin of force.

23. None of the forms apply to the Will. Remember it is only by means of time and space that something that is one and the same according to its nature and concept appears as different as a plurality of coexistent and successive things. He defines cause. Each individual man has a character of his own, this with the particular knowledge accompanying that character combined with a motive determine the unique particular effect. Inanimate objects all operate without individuality according to few universal laws.

24. If representations are not to be empty phantoms, but have a meaning, they must be the expression of something which doesn't exist merely for a subject, something that exists without dependence on the subject. [He is lead here by a motive of giving the representations meaning, not because reason leads him to a fact of meaning]. The principle of sufficient reason is the universal expression of the forms of phenomena. Description of time space causality as forms, they are all more specific forms within the form of knowledge in general which is subject and object. So these things don't belong to the representations themselves but only to the form itself. The most complete capacity for being known is the greatest clearness, distinctness, and ability to be exhaustively investigated. This most capable of being known necessarily belongs to the form of knowledge not to object. Time Space and Causality are the only forms of knowledge of perception. He thinks that if only representation existed then there would only be form and no content, and so would be mere phantom [Why does he think the will has any more significance or meaning just because it is outside the subject?] He says that in nature we can discover the laws but there will always remain a content that cannot be referred to its form. One can explain why a cause happened when and where it did but never why cause acts in general and why it acts the precise way it does.

The will is not subject to explanation. There is as much of the Will in any particular object as there is in the rest of the world. Plurality belongs to time and space and so the will is a singularity and indivisible. Plurality only concerns the visibility i.e. objectification of the will. So there is only differing degree or gradations of visibility/objectification between objects. If you destroyed one individual the world would be destoryed with it. The different grades of will expressed as individuals are Platonic forms. He says when he uses the word "Idea" he means it in the original Platonic sense which he understands as every definite and fixed grade of the Will's objectification.

26. The most general physical forces exhibit themselves as the lowest grade of the Will's objectification. Forces are not causes, and lie outside space and time and chain of cause and effects. Good stuff on causation. Forces of nature are groundless, and are immediate objectivity of the will, and this is the in-itself of the whole of nature. In the higher grades of the will's objectivity we see individuality standing out prominently, especially in man, as individual characters, i.e. as complete personality, outwardly expressed by individual physiognomy of the whole body. [What about identical twins with different personalities?] The farther you move from man the less individual character. Each man is so unique as to be an Idea in himself. Nature never forgets her laws. Laws of Nature are the relation of the Idea to the form of the phenomenon. Matter is through and through causality a union of time and space and exists only for the understanding. Lots of stuff on matter, time, space, and causality. Forces of Nature are will itself at that stage of its objectification. The Law of causality is nothing but the determination in time and space of the individual phenomena. Every natural cause is only an occasional cause.

27. Lots on Forces and arguments determining forces. Etiology determines all the effects in which each force appears differently according to the difference of the circumstances, always keeping with its own peculiar character. The character is disclosed in laws of nature, which are merely an observed rule by which nature proceeds every time as soon as definite circumstances arise. Philosophy considers the universal alone. He dismisses the attempt to reduce everything to a few natural laws because ? would be created by chance and wouldn't have any significance, and be no more interesting than any other object. He asserts that such forces could never constitute the vital force any more than a hammer and anvil constitue a blacksmith. So not even the simplest plant life could be explained by them. In such a freak no characteristic Idea would appear, meaning the will would only reveal itself as phenomena of inorganic nature and by chance in this form, not in higher grades. It would be a denial of Aristotle's forma substantialis, which is what Schopenhauer calls the degree of the will's objectification in a thing.

30. Particulars are related to the Platonic Ideas (which are just various grades of the will's objectification with gradually increasing distinctness and completeness) as the archetype is to its copies. Plurality can be conceived only through time and space, their arising and passing away through causality. The Ideas lie outside the sphere of knowledge of the principle of sufficient reason, so to know them one must abolish individuality in the knowing subject.

32. Time is merely the spread out piecemeal view that an individual being has of the ideas.

33. Knowledge in general itself is a higher grade of objectification, The individual finds his body as an object among objects to all of which it has many different relations and connections according to the principle of sufficient reason, so the sole endeavor of knowledge, serving the will, is to know those relations and their different connections in space, time, and causality; and other than this, objects are nothing. And the sciences study no more than this, and is different from ordinary knowledge only in its form, its systematic summarization everything particular in the universal by means of concepts. So all these things only have a relative existence, for time is just that by which opposite determinations belong to the same thing, and what separates the beginning of a thing from its end is simply time (an unstable, evanescent, relative thing) so all being in time is also a nonbeing. Knowledge sprang from the will and remains subordinate to its service, only in man are there rare exceptions. He cites as supporting evidence that man's eyes look farther ahead and his head is higher and more separate from his body than the animals.

34. The principle of sufficient reason's final goal is always the relation of things to our own will. So when an individual considers solely the what, devoting the whole power of the mind to perception, and lose ourselves in it, we cease to be individual and we merge with the object and are seeing the Idea not a particular object and we become pure will-less, painless, timeless subject of knowledge and are no longer within the bounds of the principle of sufficient reason. In this state the world as representation stands out as whole and pure, and complete objectification of the will takes place, for only the Idea is the adequate objectivity of the will. In itself, the Idea includes object and subject in like manner for these are its sole form, for the object is nothing but representation of the subject and the entire consciousness is nothing more than its most distinct image. [What is with all this 2 is 1 and 1 is 2 crap?] This consciousness constitutes the whole world as representation since we picture all the grades of the will passing through it successively. When the Idea appears subject and object can no longer be distinguished in it because they fill each other completely. [isn't seeing the Idea seeing grades of the will? and aren't the grades of the will still objectifications? And so don't they still require a subject-object distinction?] The subject knowing idea in themselves are not different is the will knowing itself. Plurality and difference and known and knowing individual exist only in phenomena by virtue of its form, once the world as representation is abolished all that is left is will, blind impulse. The purely knowing subject becomes immediately aware he is the condition and supporter of the world and all objective existence.

35. He writes of other people [how does he reconcile the subject being the support for the whole world with there being multiple subjects?]

36. Good summary of what has been said so far and what discipline studies what. He adds that it is art which is that knowledge that considers the Ideas through pure contemplation and then communicates them through a medium, that is its sole aim. Science is forever following the unending stream of reasons or grounds but never can find complete satisfaction, however, art is everywhere at its goal. Defined accurately it is the way of considering things independently of the principle of sufficient reason. Only through pure contemplation absorbed entirely in the object (pure perception) are the Ideas comprehended, forgetting our own person and its relations and connections, and this ability is the nature of genius and is the most complete objectivity, i.e. the objective tendency of the mind to leave entirely out of mind our own interest, our willing, and our aims, personality, and knowledge in service of the will, in order to remain pure knowing subject and clear mirror of the inner nature of the world. Men of genius are not satisfied by the present for it does not fill their consciousness, and gives them a restless, zealous nature constantly searching for new objects worthy of contemplation, and a longing, hardly ever satisfied, for men of like nature. The common man is entirely satisfied by the present and finding everywhere his like has that special ease and comfort in daily life denied to the man of genius. Imagination is an essential element of genius, which extends the mental horizon of the genius beyond the objects that actually present themselves to his person, as regards both quality and quantity, so he can see not what nature formed but what she endeavored to form, yet did not bring about due to the conflict of her forms with one another, but imagination does not make genius. He goes on to further differentiate genius from common and asserts that other thinkers, e.g. mathematicians, rational, are rarely, if ever, geniuses, and he says geniuses are always a bit crazy. However, the ability is in all men to a greater or lesser degree.


Parerga


Sketch of the History of the Ideal and the Real

He says modern philosophy mainly turns on the problem of the real and the ideal, which is the question concerning what in our knowledge is objective and what is subjective, and hence what eventually is to be ascribed by us to things different from us and what is to be attributed to ourselves.

He attributes an early idealism and ideality of time to Plotinus.

Self-consciousness is the only thing really and unconditionally given and he says that Descartes's Cogito is equivalent to Sch's own starting point "The world is my representation", except that the former proposition stresses the immediateness of the subject, the latter stresses the mediateness of the object He says they express the same thing from two different points of view, that they are the reverse of one another and refers us to his The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics.

He thinks that the discovery and release of Scotus Erigena's works were made possible by Spinoza's philosophy, suggesting that this seems to prove that the insight of individuals cannot make itself felt so long as the spirit of the age is not ripe to receive it.

He says that the widespread fame and high repute of Leibniz's Pre-established Harmony furnishes a proof of the fact that in the world the absurd most easily succeeds.

Although the distinction between mind and body or between what represents and what is extended is unfounded, it does not follow that the distinction between What represents and something objective and real existing outside of this is also unfounded. What represents and what is represented may still be homogeneous, yet the question remains whether I can infer with certainty from representations in my head the existence of entities, in themselves, different from me, that is to say, entities that are independent of those representations. Pg. 9

The difficulty is and remains merely the Cartesian, namely that the world, which alone is given immediately to us, is only ideal, in other words, one that consists of mere representations in our head; whereas, over and above this, we undertake to judge of a real world, in other words, one that exists independently of our representations. Therefore, by abolishing the difference between substantia cogitans and substantia extensa, Spinoza has still not solved this problem, but has at most again rendered physical influence admissable. This, however, does not suffice to solve the difficulty, for the law of causality is demonstrably of subjective origin. But even if that law sprang conversely from external experience, it would still belong to that world in question which is given to us only ideally. Hence, in no case can the law of causality furnish a bridge between the absolutely objective and the subjective; on the contrary, it is merely the bond that connects phenomena with one another (he refers the reader to the World as Will and Representation Vol. 2. chapt. 1)

But obscurity in the exposition always arises from obscurity of a philosopher's own understanding and study of his works. Vauvenargues has very aptly said "Lucidity is the good faith of philosophers." Pg. 11

On the other hand, Spinoza again evinces an unmistakable transcendental idealism, namely a knowledge, although only general, of the truths expounded by Locke and particularly by Kant, hence a real distinction between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, and a recognition that only the phenomenon is accessible to us.

Thus extension is by no means the opposite of representation, but lies wholly within this. We represent things as extended, and in so far as they are extended, they are our representation.

Therefore, independently of our representing, nothing extended can exist and also quite certainly nothing does exist. Pg. 12

For naturally only as represented are things extended, and only as extended are they capable of representation; the world of representation and the world in space are one and the same.

Idealism is the knowledge that what is extended in and fills space, and thus the world of intuitive perception generally, can have its existence as such absolutely only in our representation, and that it is absurd and even contradictory to attribute to it, as such, another existence outside all representation and independently of the knowing subject, and accordingly to assume a matter existing in itself. (He also contrasts idealism and spiritualism in a footnote). Pg. 14

Locke disposes of the distinction between the ideal and the real with arguments of sound but rough common sense, and by reference to the adequacy of our knowledge of things for practical purposes which obviously has nothing to do with the case and only shows how very inadequate to the problem empricism remains. Pg. 16

Sch. sees the origin of the distinction between thing-in-itself and the phenomenon in Locke.

Those qualities which Locke concedes objective existence to spring from our intellect's own special functions. The objectively perceiving consciousness (the consciousness of other things) necessarily requires a complicated apparatus, and as the function of this it appears; consequently, its most essentail fundamental determinations are already fixed from within. Therefore, the universal form, i.e. the mode, of intuitive perception, from which alone the a priori knowable can result, presents itself as the basic fabric of the intuitively perceived world and accordingly appears as the absolutely necessary factor that is without exception and cannot in any way be removed so that, already in advance, it stands firm as the condition of all other things and of their manifold variety. We know that this is first of all time and space, and what follows from them and is possible only through them. In themselves, time and space are empty; if anything is to come into them, it must appear as matter, in other words, as something acting and consequently as causality; for matter is through and through pure causality. Its being consists in its acting and vice versa, it is simply the objectively apprehended form of the understanding for causality itself. (He refers to the Fourfold and TWaWaR) Hence it follows that Locke's primary qualities are merely such as cannot be thought away; and this indicates clearly enough their subjective origin, since they result directly from the nature and constitution of the perception-apparatus itself. Pg. 18

Moreover, as a gift from fate, they were permitted, in a vulgar-minded world that was slavishly abandoned to profit and pleasure, to follow their emminent and exalted calling, indifferent as they were to the yelping of priests and to the twaddle or deliberate activities of the contemporary professors of philosophy. Pg. 19

Causality, space and time are known to us a priori, that is to say, lie within us prior to all experience, and hence belong to the subjective part of knowledge. From this it further follows that all those primary, i.e. absolute, qualities of things, which had been determined by Locke, cannot be peculiar to things-in-themselves, but are inherent in our way of knowing these, for all such qualities are composed of pure determinations of time, space, and causality, and consequently are to be reckoned as not belongind to the real, but to the ideal. Finally, it follows from this that we know things in no respect as they are in themselves, but simply and solely in their phenomenal appearance. But then the real, the thing-in-itself, remains as something wholly unknown, a mere x, and the whole world of intuitive perception accrues to the ideal as a mere representation, a phenomenon, to which, however, as such a real, a thing-in-itself, must somehow correspond. Pg. 19

I have reduced all being and knowing to the two elements of our self-consciousness and hence to something beyond which there can no longer be any principle of explanation, since it is that which is most immediate and therefore ultimate. I have thus called to mind, as follows from the investigations of all my predecessors which are here discussed, that the absolutely real, or the thing-in-itself, can never be given to us directly from without on the path of the mere representation because it is inevitably in the nature of such representation always to furnish only the ideal. On the other hand, since we ourselves are indisputably real, it must be possible in some way to draw a knowledge of the real from the interior of our own true nature. In fact, it now appears here in an immediate way in consciousness, namely as will. Accordingly, with me the line of intersection now falls between the real and ideal in such a way that the whole world of intuitive perception, presenting itself objectively, including everyone's own body, together with space, time, and causality, and consequently together with the extended of Spinoza and the matter of Locke, belongs as representation to the ideal. But in this case, only the will is left as the real, and all my predecessors, thoughtlessly and without reflection, had cast this into the ideal, as a mere result of representation and thought...Thus with me, ethics is now more directly and incomparably more closely connected with metaphysics than it is in any other system, and so the moral significance of the world and existence is more firmly established than ever. Will and Representation alone are fundamentally different in so far as they constitute the ultimate and basic contrast of all things in the world and leave no remainder. The represented thing and the representation thereof are the same; but only the represented thing, not the thing-in-itself. The latter is always will, whatever be the form in which it appears in the representation. Pg. 20

The first requirement of a philospher is a seriousness and honesty of inquiry. Pg. 21

On the other hand, that they were unable to acheive in philosophy anything substantial was ultimately due to the fact that their intellect had not become free, but had remained in the service of their will. For it is true that the intellect can acheive an extraordinary amount for the will and its aims, yet it can do nothing for philosophy, any more than it can for art. For these lay down, as their very first condition, that the intellect acts only spontaneously and of its own accord and that, during the time of this activity, it ceases to submit to the will, that is, to have in view one's personal aims. But when the intellect itself is of its own accord active, by its nature it knows of no other aim than truth. Pg. 21

One should love the truth earnestly and with one's whole heart, and thus unconditionally and unreservedly, above all else, and, if need be, in defiance of all else. Now the reason for this is the one previously stated that the intellect has become free, and in this state it does not even know or understand any other interest than that of truth. The consequence, however, is that we then conceive an implacable hatred of all lying and deception, in whatever garb they may appear. In this way, of course, we shall not get on very well in the world, but we shall in philosophy. On the other hand, the auspices for philosophy are bad if, when proceeding ostensibly on the investigation of truth, we start saying farewell to all uprightness, honesty, and sincerity, and are intent only on passing ourselves off for what we are not. We then assume, like those three sophists, first a false pathos, then an effected and lofty earnestness, then an air of infinite superiority, in order to impose where we despair of ever being able to convince. One writes carelessly because, thinking only in order to write, one had saved up one's thought till the moment of writing. The attempt is made to smuggle in palpable sophisms as proofs, to give out hollow and senseless verbiage for profound ideas...One expressly challenges the standpoint of reflection...The interest of the person is satisfied, that of truth betrayed. Pg. 22

The tone of calm investigation which had characterized all previous philosophy, is exchanged for that of unshakeable certainty, such as is peculiar to charlatanry of every kind and at all times. Pg. 23

From every page and every line there speaks an endeavor to beguile and deceive the reader, first by producing an effect to dumbfound him, then by incomprehensible phrases and even sheer nonsense to stun and stupefy him, and again by audacity of assertion to puzzle him, in short, to throw dust in his eyes and mystify him as much as possible. Pg. 23

Its exponents were concerned to appear, not to be.

For quite obviously and undeniably these [concepts] are mere abstractions from what is known through intuitive perception, and they have arisen from our arbitrarily thinking away or dropping of some qualities and our retention of others. To doubt this can never occur to any reasonable man (he refers to the Fourfold root 26). Therefore these concepts and thoughts, constituting the class of non-perceptive representations, never have an immediate relationship to the essence and being-in-itself of things. On the contrary, they have always only a mediate relation, that is, through the mediation of intuitive perception. It is this, that, on the one hand, furnishes them with the material and, on the other, stands in relation to the things-in-themselves, in other words, to the unknown, real, and true essence of things that objectifies itself in intuitive perception. Pg. 27

"For the same reason that we neglect a man of merit we are capable of adimiring a fool." - La Bruyere, Les Caracteres Pg. 28


Fragments for the History of Philosophy

Sch. sees the origin of many of his own positions in Empedocles. Pg. 34 and 35

Even in inorganic nature we see the elements seeking and avoiding one another, uniting and separating, according to the laws of elective affinity. But those that show the strongest tendency to unite chemically, a tendency that can be satisfied only in the state of fluidity, enter into the most definite electrical opposition when they come into contact with one another in the solid state; they now separate into opposite and hostile polarities in order again to seek and embrace one another. What else is that polar contrast, appearing generally in the whole of nature under the most varied forms, but a constantly renewed discord or variance on which the ardently desired reconciliation follows? Thus (Empedocles's) Love and Hate are actually present everywhere and only according to the circumstances will one or the other appear at any time. And so even we ourselves can be instantly friendly or hostile; the disposition to be either exists and awaits the circumstances. Only prudence bids us stop at the point of indifference, of unconcern, although this is at the same time the freezing-point... What lies at the basis of this universal phenomenon of the Love and Hate is, of course, ultimately the great primal contrast between the unity of all beings according to their essence-in-itself and their complete diversity and variety in the phenomenon, which has for its form the principium individuationis. Pg. 34

That the metaphysics of music, as I have explained in my chief work (Vol 1. 52; Vol 2. 39), can be regarded as an exposition of the Pythagorean philosophy of numbers, has already been briefly alluded to by me in that work...According to these, melody expresses all movements of the will as it makes itself known in man's self-consciousness; in other words, it expresses all emotions, feelings, and so on. Harmony, on the other hand, indicates the scale of the will's objectification in the rest of nature. In this sense, music is a second reality that runs entirely parallel with the first, yet it is of quite a different nature and character therefrom so that, while it has complete analogy, it has absolutely no similarity with it. But now, as such, music exists only in our auditory nerve and brain; apart from these or in itself (in the Lockean sense) it consists of mere numerical relations, first, according to their quantity, as regards measure or beat, and then, according to their quality, as regards the intervals of the scale, which rest on the arithmetical relations of vibrations. In other words, music consists of numerical relations in its rhythmic as well as its harmonic element. Accordingly, the whole nature of the world, both as microcosm and macrocosm, may certainly be expressed by mere numerical relations and thus to a certain extent be reduced thereto. In this sense, Pythagoras had been right in placing the true nature of things in numbers. But what are numbers? Relations of succession whose possibility rests on time. Pg. 37

The stuff on thinkers being writers under Socrates. Pg. 41.

As I am myself a Kantian, I wish here to express in a few words my relation to Kant. He teaches that we cannot know anything beyond experience and its possibility. I admit this, yet I maintain that in its totality experience itself is capable of an explanation, and I have endeavored to give this by deciphering it like a handwriting, but not, like all previous philosophers, by undertaking to go beyond it by means of its mere forms, a method that Kant had shown to be inadmissable. Pg. 42

A low and ignoble nature, therefore, feels even an instinctive urge to insult as soon as it begins to detect intellectual superiority. Pg. 42

Sch. attributes the origins of the rationalism of the theory of knowledge, i.e. conclusions of pure thought, to Plato and its overthrow to Kant. Pg. 43

Therefore even he [Aristotle] saw that everything purely and abstractly conceived had borrowed the whole of its material and content first from the intuitively perceived. Pg. 44

Sch. mentions a Pomponatius "De Immortalitate Animi" and a Cartesian named de la Forge (See on the Basis of Ethics 6). Pg. 45

For, as a rule, we find precisely the false doctrines of every philosopher expressed most clearly by his disciples because they are not, like the master himself, concerned with keeping as dark as possible those aspects of his system which might betray its weakness; for here they act in good faith and have nothing to fear. Pg. 45

Sch. attributes to Locke the investigation into the origin of concepts, for which the French went to the extreme under Condillac to say penser est sentir (To think is to perceive). Taken absolutely this is false; yet in it is to be found the truth that all thinking partly presupposes feeling, as an ingredient of the intuitive perception that furnishes it with its material, and that thinking, like feeling, is itself partly conditioned by bodily organs. And thus just as feeling is conditioned by the nerves of sense, so is thinking by the brain, and the two are nervous activity. Pg. 45

But although not drawn from experience, this very knowledge a priori has value and validity only for the purpose of experience. For it is nothing but the awareness of our own knowledge-apparatus and of the structure and mechanism thereof (brain-function) or, as Kant exresses it, the form of the knowing consciousness itself. This form obtains its material primarily through empirical knowledge that is added by means of sensation; but without such knowledge it is empty and useless. Precisely on this account, his philosophy is called the Critique of Pure Reason. Now through this, all that metaphysical psychology falls down and with it all Plato's pure activity of the soul. For we see that knowledge without the intuitive perception that is brought about by the body has no material, and consequently that the knower as such, without the presupposition of the body, is nothing but an empty form; not to mention that all thinking is a physiological function of the brain, just as digestion is of the stomach. Pg. 46

We can nevertheless regard my doctrine as its [Plato's rational doctrine] corrected analogue. This doctrine says that only the intuitive knowledge, that is kept clear of all connection with the will, reaches the highest objectivity and hence perfection. (Sch. refers us to his 3rd book of main work). Pg. 46

Depth of thought finds its material from within ourselves; sagacity must obtain its material from without in order to have data. Pg. 47

Deep thinking consists precisely in pursuing a line of thought to the end. Pg. 48

Aelian "Variae Historiae" Pg. 49

Sch. says Bacon is the true father of empiricism and is the opponent and subduer of Aristotle. Pg. 49

Every being of nature strives to preserve itself. Pg. 51

In chapters 11 and 12 [Of Plotinus's Ennead] very good explanations are given for the ideality of time. Connected therewith is the fine explanation that in our temporal condition, we are not what we ought to be and might be. Thus we expect from the future always better things and look foward to the fulfilment of our shortcomings; and from this arise the future and its condition, namely time. Pg. 59

The truth is, that to be free and to created are two mutually eliminating and therefore contradictory qualities; and hence the assertion that God has created beings and has at the same time given them freedom of the will is really equivalent to saying that he has created and at the same time has not created them. For operari sequitur esse, in other words the effects or actions of any possible thing can never be anything but the consequence of its nature and constitution, and only in such actions is its nature known. For to be free in the sense here demanded, a being would have to have no nature at all; in other words, it would have to be nothing at all, and so would have to be and not to be at the same time. For what is must be something; an existence without an essence cannot even be conceived. Now if a being is created, it is created as it is constituted; and so it is badly created if it is badly constituted, and it is badly constituted if it acts badly, in other words, if its effects are bad. Consequently, the guilt of the world as well as its evil, which is just as undeniable, is always shifted back onto the shoulders of the originator of the world, and like Augustine before him, Scottus Erigena wears himself out in an endeavor to exonerate the creator. Pg. 63

If, on the other hand, a being is to be morally free, it must not be created but must have aseity, that is to say, that it must be something original that exists by virtue of its own primary force and absolute power; and it must not refer to anything else. Its existence is then its own act of creation and this act unfolds and spreads itself in time, revealing once for all a decided character or disposition of that being. Nevertheless, such character or disposition is its own work and so the responsibility for all the manifestations of that character rests on the being itself. Now if a being is to be responsible for its actions, if it is to be accountable, it must be free; but from this again it follows that the will is the original thing itself. Consequently, not merely the actions, but also the existence and essence of man are his own work. Concerning all this, I refer to my essay "On the Freedom of the Will", where it is to be found fully and irrefutably discussed... The guilt of sin and evil always comes back from nature onto her creator. Now if that creator is the will itself, manifesting itself in all the phenomena of nature, that guilt has reached the right man; if, on the other hand, it is said to be a God, then the authorship of sin and evil contradict his divinity. Pg. 63,64

The mutual claim of realism and nominalism and thus the possibility of so long and obstinate a dispute over them can be clearly understood from the following remarks. I call the most heterogeneous things red if they have this color. Obviously "red" is a mere name whereby I designate that phenomenon, no matter where it is to be found. Now in the same way, all common concepts are mere names for designating qualities that occur in different things. These things, however, are what is actual and real, so that nominalism is obviously right. On the other hand, when we observe that all those actual things, to which alone reality was just now attributed, are temporal and consequently soon pass away, whereas qualities such as red, hard, etc. which are designated by those names, continue to exist regardless of this and accordingly are present at all times, we find that these qualities which are thought of precisely through common concepts whose designation are those names, have, by virtue of their ineradicable existence, much more reality. Consequently, such reality is to be attributed to concepts, not to individual entities; and so realism is right. Nominalism really leads to materialism; for, after the elimination of all qualities, only matter in the last resort is left. Now if concepts are mere names, but individual things are real, their qualities being individually transient, then matter alone remains as that which continues to exist, and consequently as the real. But strictly speaking the above mentioned claim of realism does not really belong to it, but to the Platonic Doctrine of Ideas whereof it is the extension. The eternal forms and qualities of natural things, continue to exist, in spite of all change. Thus there is attributable to them a reality of a higher kind than to the individuals in which they manifest themselves. On the other hand, this is not to be conceded to mere abstractions that cannot be supported by intuitive perception. For example, what is the real element in such concepts as "relation, difference, separation, disadvantage, indefiniteness" and so on? A certain affinity or at any rate a parallelism of contrasts is evident when we match Plato with Aristotle. One could maintain that to a certain extent, a polar divergence in the human way of thinking here shows itself. Pg. 65, 66

Nevertheless, Bacon is inferior to Aristotle in that his method, leading upwards, is by no means so correct, certain, and infallible as is Aristotle's that leads downwards. Pg. 67

In books on Arithmetic the correctness of the solution of an example usually shows itself through the balancing of the result, in other words, by the fact that no remainder is left. [He gives examples of remainders in various theories]...As the sum does not balance out, individual errors in the calculation are looked for until in the end it has to be admitted that the preliminary statement itself of the problem was wrong. On the other hand, if the general consistency and harmony of all the propositions of a system are accompanied at every step by just as universal an agreement with the world of experience, without any discord ever being heard between the two - then this is the criterion of its truth, the required balancing out of the arithmetical sum. Similarly, the preliminary statement of the problem was wrong, equivalent to saying that, even from the beginning, the matter had not been attacked from the right end, whereby one was afterwards lead from error to error. For it is with philosophy as with very many things; everything depends on whether it is tackled from the right end. Now the phenomenon of the world to be explained presents inummerable ends of which only one can be right. It is like a tangled mass of thread with many false ends hanging therefrom. Only the man who discovers the actual end is able to unravel the whole. But then one thing is easily developed from another, and from this we know that it was the right end. It can also be compared to a labyrinth that presents a hundred entrances opening into corridors all of which, after very long and intricate windings, finally lead out again with the exception of a single one, whose windings actually lead to the center where the idol stands. If we have hit upon this entrance we shall not miss the way; but by no other path can we ever reach the goal. I do not conceal the fact that I am of the opinion that only the will in us is the right end of the tangle, the true entrance to the labyrinth. Pg. 68

Vanini Willisius Flourens

But if Spinoza had inquired into the origin of that concept of substance, he was bound ultimately to have found that this was simply and solely matter, and that the true content of the concept was nothing but just the essential and a priori assignable qualities of matter. [sch. refers us to Vol. 2. chpt 24 of TWaWaR for matter's inexplicable qualities]. Pg. 70

Sch. says many philosophers did not ask themselves from whence they obtain their knowledge of such a thing as substance. If this were done, one would clearly see what he was really talking about, in other words, what intuitive perception it ultimately was that was the basis of his concept and imparted reality thereto; and then in the end the result would be only matter, and all that he says is true of this. Pg. 70,71

Again we see how rare is the really new and wholly original in all branches of thought and knowledge. Pg. 71

The first false step - the fault in a premiss which is the cause of a conclusion's also being false. And Confusion of Ground and Consequent. The cowl does not make a monk.

In point of fact, every abstract representation arises out of the representation of intuitive perception and so is based thereon. Pg. 71

In the second book he expounds the two modes of his one and only substance as extension and representation, which is obviously a false division, for extension exists simply and solely for the representation; and therefore, it should not have been opposed but subordinated thereto. Pg. 72

Colerus

bear in mind that he [Spinoza] still had too little at his disposal...The basic concepts of philosophy were not yet adequately elaborated, the problems not properly ventilated.

Like all of the others, he made knowledge instead of the will the basis and indispensable condition of everything spiritual. I was the first to vindicate for the will the primacy due to it and in this way everything in philosophy was transformed...For underlying his Monadology is the idea that matter is not a thing-in-itself, but a mere phenomenon, and therefore thta the ultimate ground of even its mechanical action must be sought not in the purely geometrical, that is to say, in what belongs merely to the phenomenon, such as extension, motion, form, and hence that impenitrability is not merely a negative quality, but the manifestation of a positive force. Pg. 75

On the whole, we always see in connection with this entire concatenation of strange dogmatic theories one fiction dragging in another for its support, just as in practical life one lie renders many others necessary.


On Philosophy at the Universities

For those who cherish one another, and are born for one another, readily come together; kindred souls already great one another from afar. pg. 139

Moreover, epithets taken from such dogmas are obviously unbecoming of philosophy, for it is devoted to the attempt of the faculty of reason to solve by its own means and independently of all authority the problem of existence. As a science, philosophy has nothing whatever to do with what may or should or must be believed, but merely with what can be known. Now if this should turn out to be something quite different from what we have to believe, then even so faith would not be impaired, for it is so by virtue of its containing what we cannot know. If we could also know this, then faith would appear as something quite useless and even ridiculous, just as if a dogma were set up over the themes of mathematics. If, however, we are convinced that the truth, whole and entire, is contained and expressed in the established religion, then we should restrain ourselves and give up all philosophizing; for we should not pretend to be what we are not. The pretence of the impartial investigation of truth, with the resolve to make the established religion the result, indeed the measure and control, of truth, is intolerable and such a philosophy, tied to the established religion like a dog to a chain, is only the vexatious caricature of the highest and noblest endeavor of mankind. pg. 143

All heterodox philosophical doctrines, with which they must at times be concerned in the course of their lives, appear to them to exist merely to be refuted and thus to establish those others the more firmly. pg. 144

and this in his old age when in nobler natures concern over the reputation a man leaves behind outweights every other. pg. 146

millions of a boundlessly egoistical, unjust, unfair, dishonest, envious, malicious, perverse, and narrow-minded race, to judge from the great majority, and of protecting the few who have acquired property from the immense number of those who have nothing but their physical strength. pg. 147

For on matters that do not promise, like the productions of poetry, amusement and entertainment but only instruction, and financially unprofitable instruction at that, that public will certainly not waste its time, effort, and energy, without first being thoroughly assured that such efforts will be richly rewarded. Now by virtue of its inherited belief that whoever lives by a business knows all about it. pg. 148

The method and tactics for this are furnished by a happy instinct, such as is readily given to every being for its self-preservation. Thus to challenge and refute a philosophy that runs counter to the norma conventionis, especially where one detects merits and certain qualities that are not conferred by a professor's diploma, is often a risky business on which, in the last resort, one should certainly not venture. For in this way, works whose suppression is indicated would aquire noteriety and be sought after by the inquistive; but then extremely unwelcome comparisons might be drawn and the result might be critical and precarious. On the contrary, as brothers of the same turn of mind and also of like ability, they unanimously regard such an inconvenient piece of work as non avenu. In order to suppress and smother it, they regard with the greatest unconcern the most important as quite unimportant and what has been thoroughly thought out and has existed for centuries as not worth talking about. They maliciously compress their lips and remain silent, yes silent with that silentium quod livor indixerit. pg. 149

All this is only a scene from the play which we have before us at all times and in all arts and sciences, that is to say, the old conflict between those who live for the cause and those who live by it, or between those who are it and those who represent it. To some it is the end in view to which their life is the mere means; to others it is the means, indeed the irksome condition, for life, well-being, enjoyment, and domestic happiness in which alone their true earnestness lies, since it is here that nature has drawn the boundary to their sphere of activity. Whoever wishes to see examples of this and become more closely acquinted therewith, should study the history of literature and read the biographies of great masters of every kind and in every art. He will then see that it has been so at all times and will understand that it will always remain so. Everyone recognizes it in the past, hardly anyone in the present. The illustrious pages of the history of literature are at the same time almost invariably the tragic. In all branches of knowledge they show us how, as a rule, merit has had to wait till the fools had stopped fooling, the merry-making had come to an end, and all had gone to bed. It then arose, like a ghost in the dead of night, to occupy the place of honor that was withheld from it, yet ultimately still as a shadow. pg. 150

Again, hardly anything is so obstructive to the actual attainment of a thorough or very deep insight and thus of true wisdom, as the constant obligation to appear wise, the showing off of so-called knowledge in the presence of pupils eager to learn and the readiness to answer every conceivable question. Worst of all, however, is that a man in such a position is seized with anxiety when any idea occurs to him, whether such will fit in with the aims and intentions of his superiors. This paralyzes his thinking to such an extent that such ideas themselves no longer dare to occur. The atmosphere of freedom is indespensible to truth. pg. 151

On the contrary, I find them all, although not always clearly conscious of this, zealously bent on the mere semblance of the business, on producing an effect, on imposing and even mystifying in order to obtain the approbation of their superiors and subsequently their students. In this connection, the ultimate aim is always to spend the proceeds of the business on living comfortably with wife and family. But it is also really in keeping with human nature which, like the animal, knows as its immediate aims only eating, drinking, and the care of offspring, that it has obtained in addition, as its special apanage, a mania for shining and showing off. pg. 151

Aristippus, Apollonius of Tyana, Euphrates pg. 154

Publilius Syrus pg. 161

Messrs. pg. 162

Making a consequent an antecedant - inverting the logical order by explaining a thing in terms of something which presupposes it pg. 162

Salat, Herbart pg. 163

For do not let ... pg. 164

Chamfort pg. 165

On the other hand, it was... pg. 167

Ramist pg. 168

Feder, Platner pg. 174

Herbart pg. 176

pg. 176 The fact that they...good reasons for not wanting to.

the note on pg. 181 is interesting as he complains there was a "postmodernist" problem then as well.

Krug, Fries, Priestly, Bruno pg. 182

It is as though Kant had had a presentiment of this last trick, for he expressly says, "men have at all times talked of the absolutely necessary being and have taken the trouble not so much to understand whether and how a thing of this nature could even be conceived, as rather to prove its existence - For to reject by means of the word unconditioned all the conditions that are always required by the understanding, in order to regard something as necessary, does not by any means enable me to understand whether through a concept of something unconditionally necessary, I am then thinking of something, or possibly of nothing at all.' Here I recall once more my doctrine that to be necessary implies absolutely and everywhere nothing but to follow from an existing and given reason or ground, such ground thus being the very condition of all necessity. Accordingly, the unconditionally necessary is a contradictio in adjecto, and is therefore no thought at all, but a hollow expression, a material that is, of course, frequently used in the structure of professorial philosophy. Further, it may here be mentioned that, in spite of Locke's great epoch-making and fundamental doctrine of the non-existence of innate ideas and of all progress since made in philosophy on this basis particularly by Kant, the gentlemen of the "Philosophy serving for renumeration" quite cooly impose on their students a 'divine consciousness', in general an immediate knowledge or understanding of metaphysical subjects through the faculty of reason. It is of no avail that Kant demonstrated with a display of the rarest acumen and depth of thought that theoretical reason can never arrive at objects that lie beyond the possibility of all experience. The gentlemen pay no regard to anything of the sort, but for fifty years have summarily taught that the faculty of reason has positively direct and absolute knowledge, that it is really a faculty originally based on metaphysics, one that immediately knows and positively grasps, beyond all possibility of experience, the so-called supersensuous, the absolute, the good Lord, and whatever else there is said to be. But it is obviously a fairy-tale, or more bluntly a palpable lie, that our reason is a faculty of such a nature that it knows the required objects of metaphysics not by means of conclusions or inferences, but immediately. pg. 184

They know nothing of the fact that we should approach the problem of existence freely and impartially and consider the world, together with the consciousness wherein it exhibits itself, as that which alone is given, as the problem. pg. 190

Thus the whole world and everything therein is full of intention, and often low, mean, and evil intention. Only one tiny spot shall, as a matter of course, remain free therefrom and be open simply to insight, indeed to that insight into relations that are of the utmost importance to all. pg. 191

There is also a passage in Sadi's Gulistan in which it says that whoever is burdened by the cares of earning a living cannot acheive anything. With reference to this, the genuine philosopher is by nature one who is easily satisfied and does not need much in order to live independently; for his motto will always be Shenstone's remark that 'Liberty is a more invigorating cordial than Torkay.' pg. 194


Transcendent Speculation

Belief in a special ... definite dogmas. pg. 201

The data for this ... we abominate. pg. 201

For this reason ... same good?" pg. 202

What I have often ... idealistic explanation. pg. 228-229


Aphorisms on the Wisdom of Life

pg. 311 Chamfort's quote

pg. 313 Cardanus. Sch. says that this essay is opposed to his real doctrine and that this essay rests on a compromise.

pg. 314 Voltaire's quote, Aristotle.

pg. 313 Sch. defines wisdom of life, for his purposes here, as the art of getting through life as pleasantly and successfully as possible. He says eudemonolgy is based on an inborn error (commented on in the 49 chapter of 2nd volume). His compromise to write this is to remain at the erroneous empirical standpoint. He says he has not repeated or compiled what others have said. He says the world will always be the same as the sages have always said the same thing and the fools have always done the opposite, and always will.

pg. 315 He divides what causes the differences in the lot of mortals to: 1) what a man is: character, health, intelligence, education, termperament. 2) What a man has. 3) What a man represents: how he is viewed by others, honor, rank, reputation.

What a man is is established by nature and is therefore much for fundamental and essential than the other two determined by choices. He quotes Metrodorus. It is within oneself that inner satisfaction or dissatisfaction arise from what we are directly aware of: our feelings, conceptions, willing, thinking; everything outside has only an indirect influence, only as they give rise to the former. So given the same environment it will affect us each differently and we each live in a world of our own, based on each person's interpretation thereof. He says this interpretation means that when one envies interesting events of life of another they should rather envy his gift of interpretation that endowed those with significance when he describes them. Like poets. The differences are due to the two halves of experience: subjective in combination with objective, and since everyone is confined to his own consciousness he cannot be helped very much from without. He says the objective half is changeable and the subjective half essentially unchangeable. Everyman bears throughout the same character, all changes are variations of the same theme. The measure of man's possible happiness is determined beforehand by this individuality. He believes the highest, most varied, and most permanent pleasures are those of the mind, and those are limited and depend on our innate intellectual ability. Houris? Hoary? One point he mentions for the inferiority of the objective is that hunger is the best sauce pg. 318.

He lists subjective qualities that make for happiness. Good stuff on top of pg 319.

It is also unique from the other two in that it cannot be wrested from us, except by time, which gives an advantage to the other two over the first, in addition to the advantage that the latter two are possibly attainable by all where as the first is not. The only thing within our power is to make the greatest possible advantage of our given personality and strive for the development, occupation, etc. suitable to it, to not use the powers one is naturally given leads to unhappiness. So it is important, especially in youth, to avoid attributing to ourselves powers which we do not possess. So it is wiser for us to aim at maintaining our health and cultivate our faculties than at acquiring wealth, beyond obtaining what is necessary and suitable needs, for beyond this wealth has little influence on our happiness, and on the contrary it results in inevitable worries about the preservation of much property. What we are contributes much more to our happiness than what we have. The highest pleasures are those of the mind. Nevertheless, people are a thousand times more concerned to become wealthy than acquire mental culture, but this is inaccesible to them so they seek sensual pleasures, amusements of every kind, and excess and dissipation. Though the second and third categories are still important and act and react on one another.

Fame is considered the Golden Fleece of the elect, only fools prefer rank to possessions. The 2nd and 3rd also act and react on one another to increase each other.

Chapter 2

This is much more a factor in happiness than the other two. The other two depend on the former as individuality is always with a person and everythign experienced is tinged by it. A man first of all enjoys himself, so one who is ill-conditioned will sour all pleasures. Leaving out grave misfortune, less depends on what happens to us than how we feel it, and thus on the degree of our individual susceptibility. Everything else is mediated and sporadic, mutable and so can be neutralized and frustrated, personality is never mediated and is constant and unchanging. For this person the envy excited by personal qualities is the most implacable, as it is also the most carefully concealed. Aristotle - For we can depend on nature, not on money. For this reason we deal better with misfortunes that we didn't bring on ourselves, for personality doesn't change. Therefore, a noble character, a happy temperament, and health are most important. The most immediate quality that makes us happy is a cheerful disposition, for it is its own reward and reason for being so and cannot be replaced by anything. Therefore we should always open wide the doors to cheerfulness whenever it appears. Instead we often hesitate because of a question of justification, or seriousness of mind. But what we improve on this hesitation is very uncertain, whereas cheerfulness is an immediate gain since we are immediately happy and it alone is the very coin of happiness and not like everything else merely a check in a bank, so he says we should make this our first endeavor to acquire and encourage it. He says that nothing contributes more to cheerfulness than health (9/10ths of it) and nothing less than wealth. He notes his observations of the general cheerfulness of the poor and rich. Then he gives a list of things that promote health. He seems to think that adisproportion between activity and inactivity is injurious (pg. 325) He demonstrates this dependency on health by pointing out how much worse the same experiences are when we are in the two different states. Epictetus's quote. Thus it follows that the greatest of follies is to sacrifice one's health for some other gain. But health isn't the only factor, for even in health we may have a melancholy temperament. The ultimate reason for this is undoubtedly to be found in the original and unalterable constitution of the organism and generally in the more or less normal relation of sensibility to irritability and power of reproduction. An abnormal exess of sensibility will produce inequality of spirits, cheerfulness and melancholy. Both Sch. and Aristotle think that genius or distinction in intellectual endeavors are melancholy. Plato and Shakespeare recognize tow types: cheerful and peevish. Sch. says as a rule the weaker the susceptibility to pleasant impressions, the greater the susceptibility to unpleasant and vice versa. He says the peevish are dissatisfied if just one of their intentions ends in failure but isn't pleased if they are successes and that more of their sufferings are imaginary not real than the cheerful, but because of their precautions their reckonings are more often right than the cheerful's. But a peevish nature in combination with bad health can often lead to suicide, this depends on the amount of suffering and objective reasons in conjunction with the susceptibility to suffering. Attractiveness also plays a part in our happiness and is a letter of recommendation that wins hearts for us in advance. Sch. splits the foes of human happiness in general into pain and boredom. Life oscillates between the two in proportional increase and decrease of each related to their antagonism of their outer and inner natures. Want and privation produce pain, security and affluence produce boredom. Sch. also thinks that greater susceptibility in one reduces susceptibility in the other which is determined by mental ability because dullness here is generally associated with dullness of sensation and a lack of sensitiveness. He says this is an inner vacuity, and is the real sources of boredom, and results in people seeking outside stimulation in pointless pastimes. The opposite is to have mental wealth that doesn't result in boredom but increases susceptibility to pain and frustrations and impatience with obstacles and greater unsociability. The interplay of his ideas and intelligence can animate the most dreary and desolate environment. Seneca's quote. Sch. concludes that we shall find on the whole that eveyrone is sociable to the extent that he is intellectually poor and generally common. A man's hard won leisures is the fruit and produce of his whole existence that is in other respects only toil and effort, and the brain is the parasite or pensioner of the entire organism by giving him the free enjoyment of his own consciousness and individuality.

"Ordinary men are...arbitrarily assumed." pg. 331. "But for this very reason...permitted to do so" pg. 332. "Therefore thos are to be...who is now alone" pg. 332, 333. Aristotle's quote. "For all the external...most brilliant" pg 333. "external circumstances...sources of pleasure".

Sch. mentions the burden of boredom on the wealthy. He mentions Aristotle's tie between a pleasure presupposing a force and so Sch. thinks we can go to the root of the manifestation of human force in the three physiological forces: power of reproduction, irritability, and sensibility. They are the sources of three kinds of possible pleasures, and each man choses according to which forces he excels in, but because humans have unique cognitive ability among living beings, sensibility gives us the greatest pleasures of these three, and the greater the cognitive ability the greater the capacity for pleasure but the greater the susceptibility to pain which is avoided by taking pleasure in pure knowledge. The normal man's concern is obtained by stirring his will and hence having for him a personal interest. Footnote on pg. 336 and 337 have pertinent stuff to his central philosophy. pg. 337 he elaborates on why stupid people suffer from boredom and smart people have exclusive pleasure.

pg. 338 Accordingly the life of...and feel them.

pg. 338 But naturally through...denied to others.

pg. 339 When our real practical...serve the will.

pg. 339 Such an intellectual life...always changing

pg. 340 He says that genius, supreme intellectual eminence, are alone those that takes existence and the nature of things entirely and absolutely as its theme, involving creative ability and deals with the relations of phenomena, and being able to wholly imbue his nature with such things, losing interest in all other things; and will express this according to its particular tendency through art, poetry, or philosophy.

pg. 340 And so only to ...the latter unpopular.

pg. 341 Lucian's quote.

pg. 340 Such an inwardly...finest existence.

Sch. notes that leisure is foreign to man's customary fate. Leisure is a burden to the normal man and brings him danger as "It is difficult to keep quiet when one has nothing to do." A smart man needs leisure, for without it he is a Pegasus under the yoke and will be unhappy.

pg. 342 He says greater intellectual gifts in consequence of greater nervous activity produce enhanced sensitiveness to pain, in addition, there is a passionate temperament that conditions such gifts with greater vividness and completeness of concepts produce greater intensity of emotions. Finally, great... him his luck. Quotes of Sophocles and Bible pg. 344. Voltaire's quote pg 343 and 344 Describes phillistines pg 344 He is happy enough...lapse into boredom

pg. 345 On the contrary...rage and rancour.

Chapter III

pg. 346 Epicurus divided human needs into three classes: natural and necessary; natural and unnecessary; not natural and unnecessary. The limit of ones reasonable desire for possessions is relative between his possessions and his claims. A man who it has never occured to to claim certain things, does not miss them and is satisfied without them; whereas another who has 100 times more feels unhappy because he lacks the thing he is claiming. Sch. uses horizon example. If a wealthy man's plans are foiled his other possessions don't comfort him. We desire wealth and fame more the more we have of each. After the loss of wealth or position we adjust once the initial grief and sorrow are overcome, we reduce our claims. In good fortune our claims are pressed even higher, and this produces delight until the operation is entirely performed. The source of our dissatisfaction lies in our constantly renewed attempts to press the amount of our claims even higher. While the other factor remains fixed and prevents this from happening.


Paralipomena

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